Rising Sino-Vietnamese tensions in the South China Sea by Dicke, Vera & Holbig, Heike
www.ssoar.info
Rising Sino-Vietnamese tensions in the South
China Sea
Dicke, Vera; Holbig, Heike
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Dicke, V., & Holbig, H. (2014). Rising Sino-Vietnamese tensions in the South China Sea. (GIGA Focus International
Edition, 8). Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale
Studien. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-405527
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Number 8
2014
ISSN 2196-3940
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus
IN
T
E
R
N
AT
IO
N
A
L
  E
D
IT
IO
N
 E
ng
lish
Rising Sino-Vietnamese Tensions  
in the South China Sea
Vera Dicke and Heike Holbig
In May 2014 China started to drill for oil near the Paracel Islands, an area claimed by 
both Vietnam and China as territorial waters, which led to considerable diplomatic 
tensions and violent actions against Chinese enterprises in Vietnam.
Analysis
China’s recent activity reveals an increasing assertiveness, which has raised concerns 
about possible military actions in the South China Sea. One could argue that China’s 
latest undertaking is proof of its increasingly threatening behavior, thereby confirming 
the “China threat” thesis. However, when analyzing the context of the South China Sea 
disputes in recent years, the aforementioned events are consistent with an increasingly 
assertive behavior demonstrated by several claimant states. China’s conduct in the 
South China Sea is determined by local conflict dynamics and should therefore not 
dictate Chinese foreign policy in other areas.
  At first glance, China’s behavior could be interpreted as symptomatic of a country 
that is attempting to change the world order. This could provide the United States 
and Japan, who are increasingly distrustful of China, with justification for further 
containing China and embarking on a more confrontational course with the Chinese 
government.
  Politics in the South China Sea, where the territorial claims of several states overlap, 
are marked by a high degree of legal ambiguity, symbolic actions and nationalist 
resentment. Any provocative action should be interpreted within this conflict context.
  Although China’s behavior in the South China Sea has indeed become increasingly 
assertive, so has that of several other claimant states – among them the Philippines 
and Vietnam. Therefore, China’s drilling activities should not be taken as evidence 
of a growing boldness in other policy areas but rather as part of China’s strategy in 
the South China Sea.
  The perception of an increasingly assertive China does not stand up to an examination 
of its actual behavior in international politics. However, acting according to this 
perception in the longer run could create mistrust and frustration on the Chinese 
side and turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
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A Highly Controversial Oil Platform
Recent events in the South China Sea give cause 
for serious concern and raise questions about Chi-
na’s territorial policy. On 3 May 2014 China an-
nounced that the state-owned China National Off-
shore Oil Corporation (CNOCC) would deploy an 
oil rig in an area near the Paracel Islands. This  area 
in the South China Sea is claimed by both China 
and Vietnam as territorial waters and represents 
one of many disputed areas in the South China Sea. 
The Vietnamese government objected to this move 
and declared that the oil platform would be operat-
ing within its territorial maritime zone. Neverthe-
less, China suited the action to the word and situ-
ated the Haiyang Shiyou 981 platform in the dis-
puted waters and safeguarded the rig with a three-
mile exclusion zone defended by approximate-
ly 80 coast guard and military vessels. Approach-
ing Vietnamese ships were rammed and targeted 
with water cannons. This incident triggered large-
scale demonstrations among the Vietnamese pop-
ulation, which culminated in riots against Chinese 
citizens and enterprises that left at least four people 
dead and saw thousands of Chinese workers flee 
Vietnam (The Economist 2014). The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in which Viet-
nam pushed for official condemnation of China’s 
behavior, reacted rather softly to these events and 
opted not to censure China directly (Panda 2014). 
The drilling platform remained in place until mid-
July 2014 and provoked several incidents between 
Vietnamese and Chinese boats (Consulate of Viet 
Nam 2014). Declaring that the exploratory drilling 
had been completed, the CNOCC withdrew the 
platform one month earlier than planned. How-
ever, the situation remains tense. On 9 Septem-
ber 2014 Vietnam accused China of having arrest-
ed and beaten up two Vietnamese fishermen. Chi-
na claimed that the men were unlawfully fishing 
with explosives. Vietnam has demanded compen-
sation for the fishermen, while China has called for 
an end to illegal fishing activities (The China Post 
2014). Since the deployment of the oil platform, 
both nations have adopted a more assertive tone.
Do these events show that China’s behavior has 
become increasingly forceful, thereby confirming 
the “China threat” thesis? If so, it would provide 
other states – especially the United States – with a 
reason to pursue a containment policy toward Chi-
na. Because such an approach would entail seri-
ous attempts to limit China’s growing power and 
the consequent risks and disturbances for all con-
cerned parties, it is important to scrutinize  whether 
the Chinese threat actually exists. In this Focus is-
sue, we will investigate the threat potential eman-
ating from the recent events by taking into account 
the regional context of the South China Sea and 
China’s general behavior in foreign politics. First, 
we will explain the theoretical background of the 
“China threat” thesis and analyze the current situ-
ation from this viewpoint. Second, we will scruti-
nize this argument by taking into account the gen-
eral context of the South China Sea, the territorial 
disputes in recent years between China and Viet-
nam, and China’s behavior in other areas of foreign 
policy. Third, we will briefly assess the value of a 
containment policy in this setting and recommend 
how other states should react to the recent Sino-
Vietnamese tensions. 
Is China Finally Revealing its True Colors?
China’s placement of an oil platform in disputed 
waters appears to support the perception of the Chi-
nese threat to US hegemony and the Western world 
order. This theory also assumes that China will be-
have more assertively and provocatively toward its 
neighbors, as they did vis-à-vis Vietnam. The “Chi-
na threat” thesis developed in Anglo-American 
debates during the 1990s against the backdrop of 
the growing awareness of China’s rise. It was re-
inforced by Chinese elite discourses that continu-
ally circulated negative images of the People’s Re-
public of China allegedly held in the West, partic-
ularly the “Western ‘China Threat Theory’ ”, in an 
effort to consolidate nationalist identity at home 
(Callahan 2006). Although the use of the concept 
had declined greatly during the early years of the 
new century, its popularity picked up again in 
2008 with observers noting a new assertiveness in 
 China’s rhetoric and foreign policy that suggested 
“[t]he Chinese are finally ‘revealing their true col-
ors’ ” (Swaine 2010: 1).
The school of realism provides substantial ar-
guments for the Chinese threat. Given the anar-
chic circumstances of the international system, ev-
ery state seeks to secure its survival by minimiz-
ing the potential of attack by a stronger state. For 
a relatively strong state such as China, the best 
way to achieve this goal is to become more pow-
erful than the potential aggressors in its neighbor-
hood – that is, to become a regional hegemon. The 
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United States, which according to Mearsheimer is 
not a global hegemon but “the only regional hege-
mon in modern history” (Mearsheimer 2010: 388), 
will try to contain China’s rise because it is a peer 
competitor of similar strength and thus reduces 
US security. China, on the other hand, will even-
tually challenge US power as it is the best way to 
ensure its own long-term survival. According to 
Mearsheimer, there is “considerable potential for 
war” between the two powers (Mearsheimer 2006: 
160). Furthermore, some authors see an ideologi-
cal conflict between China and the current interna-
tional order that is shaped by Western values. As 
soon as it has enough power, China will either try 
to modify this order or construct a “parallel order 
more to its liking,” within which it can exercise re-
gional dominance (Pei 2014: 147).
Taking the recent events into account, these re-
alist scenarios appear to be quite probable. By drill-
ing for oil in this contested area, China has made 
clear that it will not relinquish its territorial claims. 
Furthermore, China has shown that it can assume 
control over these areas without fear of military 
reprisals from its smaller neighbors. For instance, 
despite having recently deepened its ties with the 
United States, Vietnam remained powerless against 
the 80 Chinese coast guard and military vessels that 
surrounded the controversial Haiyang Shiyou 981 
rig. At the same time, the other ASEAN states re-
frained from officially condemning China’s actions 
so not to upset their important trading partner. It 
is thus clear that China has completed the first step 
toward regional hegemony. Although China is not 
yet ready to openly confront the United States, the 
Paracel Islands proved to be an ideal test case to ob-
serve US reactions toward such assertive behavior. 
From a Chinese perspective, the results were posi-
tive: the United States merely condemned China’s 
behavior as “provocative,” which could be consid-
ered quite a soft reaction (Panda 2014).
In the view of some analysts, the islands in the 
South China Sea constitute a core interest for Chi-
na and are nearly as important as the Taiwan issue 
(Goldstein 2013: 137). According to Luo Shou and 
Wang Guifang, the main task now for a rising Chi-
na is to construct a secure surrounding environ-
ment by upholding the integrity of state sovereign-
ty and national identity (cited in Lynch 2009: 100). 
If we assume that “China will want to dictate the 
boundaries of acceptable behaviour to neighbour-
ing countries” (Mearsheimer 2006: 162), China’s 
placement of the oil platform shows that it places a 
premium on others respecting its territorial claims 
– otherwise they will be implemented by force.
To contain this development, the United States 
has launched a strategic “pivot” to Asia, which has 
seen them considerably increase their military and 
economic engagement in China’s neighborhood 
dur ing the past few years. With this initiative, the 
United States has signaled to the Chinese govern-
ment that it is prepared to act aggressively if re-
quired. According to the US government, the  pivot 
shall protect international law and norms, safe-
guard commerce and freedom of navigation and 
ensure peaceful conflict resolution with emerging 
powers in the Asia-Pacific region (Manyin 2012). 
Some observers argue that this could make China 
think twice about intimidating its neighbors (Pei 
2014). As we can see, the strategies of other powers 
(e.g., the United States) will be greatly influenced 
by how they interpret China’s behavior and wheth-
er they perceive China as a threat. Therefore, before 
making strategic decisions, the context of the South 
China Sea should be taken into consideration.
The South China Sea: A Sensitive Area
The territorial claims of several states overlap in 
the South China Sea. Multiple small island groups 
and reefs are disputed by China, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. The 
Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands have espe-
cially given rise to confrontations between the dif-
ferent nations’ respective coast guard and fisher-
men. In 1974 China occupied the Vietnamese part 
of the Paracel Islands and has exercised full con-
trol over the islands ever since. In 1988 the same 
happened with several atolls and reefs of the 
Spratly Islands. These two clashes between China 
and Vietnam have thus far been the only military 
confrontations in the area. Usually, water can-
nons fired by coast guard ships are the heaviest 
weapons used in these disputes. Injuries or deaths 
resulting from such skirmishes are rare, but the 
diplo matic consequences of such incidents have 
often been severe (Kreuzer 2014).
China and Taiwan claim all island groups in the 
South China Sea to be their territory. China makes 
use of the so-called nine-dash line that encompass-
es all islands in the South China Sea (Swaine and 
Fravel 2011). Vietnam lays claim to the Spratly Is-
lands and the Paracel Islands; the Philippines, to 
parts of the Spratly Islands. Meanwhile, Malaysia, 
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Brunei and Indonesia insist on their exclusive eco-
nomic zones (EEZs) and the islands within them 
(Kreuzer 2014). All nations ground their claims in 
historical argumentation: They have all exercised 
their sovereign rights at different periods of time 
– often simultaneously over the aforementioned is-
lands – and thus appeal to customary law, accord-
ing to which a state might gain sovereignty over a 
territory if its exercise of sovereign rights was tol-
erated by other states over a long period of time. 
As the islands have never been inhabited due to 
their remote location and were only used as fish-
ing grounds by the different nations, it is virtual-
ly impossible to decide on these historical claims. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982, further compli-
cates the disputes by assuring nation states an EEZ 
of up to 200 nautical miles from the coast (ibid.). 
In these zones, the nation state has the right to ex-
ploit and explore resources, such as fishing, install-
ing wind turbines and drilling for oil. The posses-
sion of some islands in the middle of the sea would 
enlarge an EEZ considerably.
A Spiral of Reactions and Counterreactions
To assess China’s behavior, we should take a clos-
er look at the recent events. Roughly since 2009 
the conduct of all claimants in the South China Sea 
has become increasingly aggressive. In May 2009 
a UN deadline expired that had been set for the 
affected Southeast Asian states to submit their re-
spective claims on areas going beyond their EEZs 
(Kreuzer 2014). Vietnam, Malaysia and 
the Philippines submitted claims that 
en compassed disputed waters (Swaine 
and Fravel 2011). China reacted with a 
note verbale to the UN Secretary- General, 
claiming “indisputable sovereignty over 
the islands of the South China Sea” 
(ibid.: 2), which triggered counterclaims 
by the Philippines. Tensions have since 
increased in the South China Sea. Vari-
ous countries’ coast guard ships have 
rammed fishing boats, while exploration 
vessels have been forced by other na-
tions to leave disputed areas. The roles 
of aggressor and victim have constant-
ly changed, although confrontations be-
tween China and Vietnam or the Phil-
ippines have more frequently been re-
ported than those between Vietnam and the Phil-
ippines. In 2012 the Philippines was the first coun-
try since the 1980s to use an armed military ship on 
the Scarborough Shoal against Chinese fishermen. 
In the context of the South China Sea disputes, this 
was a clear sign of escalation (Kreuzer 2014). 
Although reports about risky incidents and 
coast guard ships ramming fishing boats have in-
creased, Vietnam’s strategy toward China seems 
to be more subtle. In 2007 it amplified its own 
oil exploration efforts in waters also claimed by 
China and in 2011 conducted seismic surveys in 
those same waters (Swaine and Fravel 2011). In 
the diplomatic realm, Vietnam’s strategy has been 
to internationalize the dispute – something Chi-
na wants to avoid – in order to generate support 
for its claims among the international community 
(Swaine and Fravel 2011). It has hosted several in-
ternational conferences about the South China Sea 
(the last in July 2014), the deployment of the Hai-
yang Shiyou 981 platform and the possibilities of 
an international lawsuit against China (ibid.; Dien 
2014). By inviting international guests, Viet nam is 
publicly underlining its own claims and trying to 
legitimize them. Vietnam also decided to take le-
gal action against China over the Haiyang Shiyou 
981 rig (Dien 2014). 
Despite this, there have also been diplomatic ef-
forts to ease tensions between the two countries. 
For example, in 2011 China and Vietnam agreed 
to conduct bilateral negotiations on the South Chi-
na Sea and to enhance cooperation in less sensitive 
fields, such as maritime environmental protection 
and sea-related scientific research (Vietnam+ 2011). 
Source:  <http://namvietnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/25-nine-
dashed-line-in-the-south-china-sea.jpg> (22 October 2014).
1
- 5 -GIGA Focus International Edition/English  8/2014
Hotlines between the countries’ respective for-
eign ministries and agriculture ministries were es-
tablished in order to manage emerging confron-
tations. Furthermore, during Premier Li Keqiang’s 
visit to Vietnam in October 2013 (Vietnam News 
2013), numerous agreements were signed, thus re-
vealing how intense economic and diplomatic co-
operation had become throughout the previous 
few years. 
However, in the security realm, things look dif-
ferent. Vietnam is increasingly strengthening its 
ties with the United States and Japan (Manyin et 
al. 2012), both of which support Vietnam’s coast 
guard – a central actor in the disputes in the South 
China Sea. In the light of China’s positioning of 
the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig, Vietnamese offi-
cials have suggested that US warships could be al-
lowed to visit the country’s strategic port of Cam 
Ranh Bay. Whereas the Philippines has sided with 
the United States as part of a bandwagoning strat-
egy and opposes China, Vietnam has employed a 
balancing approach and cooperates with both the 
United States and China in order to preserve room 
for maneuver (Kreuzer 2014). In view of the recent 
events, however, this balance of cooperation might 
tilt toward the United States.
China has a longstanding two-pronged strat-
egy in the South China Sea. On the one hand, it 
tries to avoid severe conflicts through negotiation 
and cautious management. In these negotiations, 
it aims at deferring any final solution. On the oth-
er hand, it maintains a fierce defense against any 
attempts by the other claimant states to change the 
status quo to its disadvantage (Swaine and  Fravel 
2011). China’s placement of the Haiyang Shiy-
ou 981 rig could fall into the second part of this 
strategy. Although it is difficult to say what exact-
ly triggered China’s decision to move the oil plat-
form into the disputed waters, it is highly prob-
able that China – despite diplomatic efforts on 
both sides – felt provoked by Vietnam in a spi-
ral of reactions and counterreactions. For exam-
ple, in 2012 PetroVietnam and CNOCC both in-
vited foreign companies to explore the same area 
in the South China Sea, which resulted in a diplo-
matic crossing of swords (Bloomberg News 2012). 
This may have instigated a race to be the first to 
drill for oil in this area. If the deployment of the 
oil platform fits with the second part of the two-
pronged strategy, its early withdrawal could be-
long to the first part – namely, the avoidance of 
severe conflicts. In removing the oil rig from the 
disputed waters one month earlier than sched-
uled, China reaffirmed that the purpose of the oil 
rig was exploratory drilling and that it had always 
intended to leave once it had finished its work. 
Nevertheless, the diplomatic damage had certain-
ly been done and will remain for some time. It is 
thus clear that the second element of China’s two-
pronged strategy guided this action.
To be clear, China’s actions in the South Chi-
na Sea cannot be described as peaceful or purely 
as self-defense; though the same can be said about 
the other claimant states. The level of assertiveness 
by all concerned parties has increased consider-
ably in recent years and has triggered an endless 
spiral of provocations, reactions and counterreac-
tions. The alleged – and in fact questionable (Kreu-
zer 2014) – oil reserves only explain part of this de-
velopment. Territorial issues have always been and 
always will be an area of high sensitivity. Deci-
sions have to be balanced between strategic geopo-
litical con siderations, diplomatic conduct and na-
tionalist sentiment among the population. In recent 
years strategic geopolitical concerns and national-
ism have clearly dominated, though the remain-
ing rules of diplomatic conduct have been able to 
prevent major escalations. Also, China’s decision 
in spring 2013 to merge the various competing bu-
reaucracies in charge of maritime policies into the 
new State Oceanic Administration – which aims 
to regain control and command over domestic ac-
tors’ be havior in territorial disputes with neighbor-
ing countries (Noesselt and Hieber 2013) – corrob-
orates the willingness of the Chinese leadership to 
avoid a dynamic escalation of existing tensions.
Short-Term versus Longer-Term Implications
How should we assess the rising tensions in Sino-
Vietnamese relations against the backdrop of an 
ongoing shift of global power constellations? As 
this paper has argued, once the wider context of 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea is tak-
en into account, there is no indication that Chi-
na has unilaterally expanded its claims or used 
force on an unusual scale. Although the govern-
ment has been somewhat more assertive about its 
territorial claims in the Pacific since 2009, partic-
ularly vis-á-vis Japan, this should not be regard-
ed as an expression of expansionist ambitions. For 
the time being this confirms the general impres-
sion that the country’s foreign policy strategy has 
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not fundamentally changed since the new party-
state leadership under Xi Jinping came to pow-
er in 2012 (Noesselt and Hieber 2013). Rather, it 
seems that secure surroundings, good trade rela-
tions with neighboring states and the capability 
of the United States to protect the sea routes are 
highly valued by the Chinese government as safe-
guards of its priority goal of economic develop-
ment. The strategy of deferring the disputes in the 
South China Sea while maintaining its current ter-
ritorial claims corresponds with China’s core in-
terest; challenging the world order certainly does 
not. In contrast to economic development, China’s 
lea dership seems to have consciously avoided de-
fining the South China Sea as a core interest be-
cause doing so could impede a negotiated settle-
ment of the disputes (Johnston 2013).
In the medium and longer term, though, things 
may look different. Even though China used to 
comply relatively well with – and benefitted con-
siderably over the past two decades from – the 
rules of the game of the liberal world order, it 
has now started to attempt to reshape those rules. 
Judging from its role in large multilateral frame-
works such as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO 
and the global climate regime, the Chinese gov-
ernment has become increasingly proactive in de-
manding more say on global governance issues 
over the past few years. Although China’s ap-
proach to reshaping the global rules can be de-
scribed as evolutionary rather than revolutionary, 
it does so in a manner that can be seen as a clear 
challenge to what it sees as US hegemony in these 
organizations. Given its strong economic perfor-
mance, these attempts might be successful in the 
longer run – particularly if the Chinese leadership 
manages to communicate more coherently with 
other emerg ing economies (Kappel and Pohl 2013; 
Hou et al. 2014). 
If this trend of an incremental global shift of 
economic power and rule-shaping capacities con-
tinues, it might also have implications for Chi-
na’s geopolitical and territorial ambitions. When 
faced with any increasing challenge to its global 
hegemony, the United States has tended to react 
with more assertive behavior, such as the “Pivot 
to Asia” strategy formulated in 2011. Not only is 
the increased military engagement of the United 
States already suspiciously observed by China, it 
has led to a growing potential for misperceptions 
on all sides. If anything, the “Pivot to Asia” strate-
gy will aggravate the already existing security di-
lemmas in the Pacific and the South China Sea in 
particular. Specifically, it will increase the risks 
for all parties involved in the territorial disputes 
to mistake each other’s defensive actions as offen-
sive intentions and will stimulate military build-
ups (see also Glaser 2011; Goldstein 2013). The 
United States may well have other valid reasons 
for increasing its engagement in the region; at 
the same time, however, it should avoid appear-
ing as though it is engaged in a containment pol-
icy toward China. As Charles Glaser points out, 
“the popular belief that a rising China will severe-
ly threaten US security could become a self-fulfill-
ing prophecy” (Glaser 2011: 89).
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